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CHAPTER 2 
Conveyancing 
RICHARD B. JOHNSON 
A. NEW SUBDIVISION CONTROL LAW 
§2.1. Background. The new Subdivision Control Law! was ap-
proved by the Governor on July 4, 1953. It took effect, accordingly, 
on the second of October.2 
Subdivision control, or governmental planning of the development' 
of land, is not new to Massachusetts. At first, the function of the plan-
ning boards was almost solely advisory, particularly with respect to 
private development.3 As time went on, and it became more apparent 
that yesterday's substandard private development is today's town head-
ache, the boards were given more powers. Genllrally speaking, the 
sanctions by which their powers were enforced were the withholding 
of municipal services and of building permits in subdivisions made 
without their approval. Planning, of course, is closely akin to zoning. jf 
Both concern the use of land, rather than the title to it, and convey-
ancers have traditionally considered themselves as not obliged to pass 
on the legal problems involved in a particular use to which land is 
to be put. They saw no difference in kind between a permit to build 
a dwelling house and a permit to erect and operate a filling station. 
Both were problems for someone else after the conveyancer had ascer-
tained who owned the land. This was particularly (and necessarily) 
true of the leading conveyancing institution in the Commonwealth-
the Land Court. 
Independent conveyancers, dealing with unregistered land, are sub-
ject to no such limitations, however, and as more and more towns and 
RICHARD B. JOHNSON is a partner in the law firm of Ropes, Gray, Best, Coolidge 
and Rugg, Boston. His monograph Mechanics of Title Examination in Massachu-
setts was included as an appendix in the 1949 Supplement to Crocker's Notes on 
Common Forms (Swaim ed.), and was reprinted in substantially the same form in 
Casner and Leach, Cases and Text on Property (1950). 
§2.1. 1 Acts of 1953, c. 674. 
• See the foreword by Richard Preston, Commissioner of the Department of Com-
merce, to an annotation of the new statute prepared by the Division of Planning in 
September, 1953. 
3 See Nichols, The Massachusetts Law of Planning and Zoning 21 et seq., (1943); 
House Doc. 2249, Report of the Special Commission on Planning and Zoning 8, 9 
(1953). 
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cities have adopted more and more zoning restrictions, an increasing 
number of conveyancers have come to regard municipal limitations on 
the use of land as a subject of as much concern to them as private re-
strictions. 
§2.2 Earlier legislation. In the meantime, the planners were being 
r given more powers. Neither the planners nor the conveyancers real-
ized at first that they were sailing collision courses, but there is no 
doubt that sooner or later a series of small encounters would have 
made it clear that planners and conveyancers needed to sit down to-
gether and work out a program reconciling the public need for control 
of haphazard land development with the public need for reducing the 
expense of transferring real estate. However, a real collision occurred 
with the enactment of Chapter 182 of the Acts of 1949. This pro-
vided that no rights could be acquired in a way other than a public 
way in a subdivision either expressly or by implication, unless the 
way be shown on an approved plat. This was crossing the line. After 
some deliberation, the Land Court decided that a limitation on ac-
cess to land differed in kind, and not just in degree, from a limitation 
on the use of land, and concluded that the court's jealously guarded 
assurance fund might be jeopardized by the issuance of a certificate 
of title to land that couldn't be reached except by helicopter. The 
• problem for the court was not confined to pending and future registra-
tion proceedings. The new statute applied to plans already recorded 
except with respect to lots not yet sold, and the Land Court Engineer 
had, prior to the statute, approved and sent to the local registries a 
number of subdivision plans of registered land, not all the lots on 
which had been sold by 1949. A stop order was sent out, instructing 
the assistant recorders in each registry not to issue any more certifi-
cates for subdivided lots unless and until the court had determined 
whether local planning board approval was necessary, and, if neces-
sary, had been duly obtained. 
At the same time, the conveyancers began to act. In December, 
1949, and May, 1950, the Massachusetts Law Quarterly published ar-
ticles by John A. McCarty of the Boston Bar, criticizing the Subdivision 
Control Law.! Meetings of the Conveyancers' Association and the Ab-
stract Club also criticized it. As a result, Philip Nichols, well-known 
authority on municipal law, counsel for the Massachusetts Federation 
of Planning Boards, conveyancer and member of the Abstract Club, 
introduced a bill in the legislature to amend the law.2 The bill was re-
ferred, with others on the same or related subjects, to a Special Com-
mission.3 The deadline for 1952 legislation passed, and the Special 
Commission was continued.4 The Commission in 1953 recommended 5 
§2.2 134 Mass. L.Q., No.5, p. 3 (1949); 35 id., No.2, p. 8 (1950). 
• House No. 853 (1951). 
3 Resolves of 1951, c. 55. 
• Resolves of 1952, c. 89. 
• The Commissioner's report is House Doc. 2249 (1953). 
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the enactment of a draft, and after various changes the ultimate re-
sult was Chapter 674 of the Acts of 1953. 
§2.3. Requirements of proper registry records on subdivisions. If 
it were feasible to punish violations of sound planning principles by 
fining the wrongful subdivider,l or sending him to jail, lawyers would 
have no more trouble with subdivision control than they have with 
laws controlling the sale of narcotics or other forms of misbehavior. 
Criminal sanctions were not, however, satisfactory, no doubt for good 
and sufficient reasons, and the policy of imputing guilt to the land, 
like an ancient deodand,2 seems to be settled. Unfortunately, the 
point was overlooked that to punish, by denial of privileges, certain 
parcels of land for the offense of having been improperly subdivided is 
to create for conveyancers the problem of ascertaining the guilt or in-
nocence of every parcel of land which has been divided since the ad-
vent of subdivision control. 
Under the old statute, this was a difficult and time-consuming task. 
For one thing, the statute did not apply uniformly to all areas of the 
Commonwealth,3 and hence it was necessary to investigate town or 
city records to learn whether or not the law applied to the time and 
place of a particular subdivision. In rural parts of the state where 
town clerks are part-time officials, available only on such evenings as 
they may happen to spend at home, this was especially difficult. The 
new statute4 makes it possible to determine this question conclusively , 
without leaving the registry of deeds, because it requires the relevant 
information to be furnished to the register, and suspends the operation 
of the law in any city or town which fails to furnish it to him. The 
last sentence of Section 8lQ also requires rules and regulations 
adopted by any planning board to be transmitted to the register. 
§2.4. Definition of a "subdivision." Various changes were made in 
the definition of a "subdivision" as a result of difficulties and ambigui-
ties discovered in the old. The new definition1 and the 0ld2 are set 
out below. 
§2.3. 1 See Conn. Gen. Stat., c. 45, §858 (1949); Me. Rev. Stat., c. 80, §85 (1944). 
• An animal or thing which caused the death of a human and was therefore for-
feited to the king for pious purposes. 
3 See §81N of the new statute (G.L., c. 41, inserted by Acts of 1953, c. 674, §7) for a 
detailed statement of the cities and towns in which the law may be in effect. Note 
that some towns (e.g., Belmont) may have planning boards established under G.L., 
c. 41, §70, prior to December 31, 1936, without the power of subdivision control. 
• G.L., c. 41, §81EE and the last sentences of §81N and §81X, inserted by Acts of 
1953, c. 674, §7. 
§2.4. 1 The new definition reads as follows: "'Subdivision' shall mean the division 
of a tract of land into two or more lots in such manner as to require provision for 
one or more new ways, not in existence when the subdivision control law became 
effective in the city or town in which such land lies, to furnish access for vehicular 
traffic to one or more of such lots, and shall include resubdivision, and, when appro-
priate to the context, shall relate to the process of subdivision or the land or terri-
tory subdivided; provided, however, that the division of a tract of land into two or 
more lots shall not be deemed to constitute a subdivision within the meaning of the 
3
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As can be seen in a comparison of the definitions, some major 
changes were made. The old definition made the "purpose" of the 
subdivider a determining factor although such purpose is not ascer-
tainable from the registry records. The clause was dropped from the 
new definition. 
The phrase "in such a manner as to require provision for a way" 
was also clarified to some extent as can be seen in the definition. The 
old provision had proved troublesome because of its ambiguity. Some 
subdividers sought a loophole here and gerrymandered their lots in 
such a manner that the inner lot had a long thin tail extending to a 
public way. This appendage was carved out in fee as part and parcel 
of the lot, not as an appurtenance, and it was claimed that this elim-
inated the necessity of "provision for a way" to furnish access. Often 
the real access was over an unapproved way in a different location. 
This device was even more objectionable when undivided fractional 
interests in fee in the appendage were granted to the buyers of several 
lots. Furthermore, and this was a defect from the planning stand-
point, if an ancient way, no matter how narrow, crooked, and steep, 
led through the tract to be divided, no division of the tract into lots 
touching the ancient way was considered a "subdivision." This was 
not only ribbon development; it was development on a rather ragged 
ribbon.3 
In view of all this, it was expected that the planning groups would 
agree to discarding the phrase "in such manner as to require provision 
for a way" in favor of a better definition. Suggestions to that effect 
made by the Abstract Club were rejected, perhaps because the rather 
vigorous treatment which the idea of planning had received at meet-
ings of the club made proposals from that quarter suspect. Moreover, 
subdivision control law if, at the time when it is made, every lot within the tract so 
divided has frontage on a public way or a way shown on a plan theretofore approved 
in accordance with the subdivision control law, of at least such distance as is then 
required by zoning or other ordinance or by-law, if any, of said city or town for 
erection of a building on such lot, and if no distance is so required, has such front-
age of at least twenty feet. Conveyances or other instruments adding to, taking away 
from, or changing the size and shape of, lots in such a manner as not to leave any 
lot so affected without the frontage above set forth, or the division of a tract of land 
on which two or more buildings were standing when the subdivision control law 
went into effect in the city or town in which the land lies into separate lots on each 
of which one of such buildings remains standing, shall also not be deemed to con-
stitute a subdivision." G.L., c. 41, §81L, inserted by Acts of 1953, c. 674, §7 (the new 
statute strikes out §§81K-81Y, inclusive, in the former law and inserts in place thereof 
§§81K-81GG. 
2 "The word 'subdivision' as used in sections eighty-one L to eighty-one U, in-
clusive, shall mean the division of a lot, tracts or parcel of land into two or more 
lots, sites or other divisions of land for the purpose, whether immediate or future, of 
sale or building development, in such a manner as to require provision for a way, 
public or private, to furnish access to one or more of such lots, sites or divisions, and 
shall include resubdivision, and, when appropriate to the context, shall relate to the 
process of subdividing or the land or territory subdivided." G.L., c. 41, §81K. 
3 See House Doc. 113, Report of the State Planning Board (1951). 
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there would have been strong OpposItIOn on constitutional grounds 
to allowing planning boards to disregard rights in ancient ways. Al-
though such constitutional objections would seem to be unsound, 
the fact remains that veneration for ancient ways would have made a 
radical alteration of the definition, however desirable, a very touchy 
matter. 
On the other hand, the planning groups did agree to add words 
specifying what is not a subdivision. These exclusions are quite signif-
icant. The additional language removes from the definition of sub-
division the following: (1) a division of a tract into lots if every lot 
has frontage on a public way or on an approved private way of at least 
a distance required by the applicable zoning laws for the erection of 
a building on the lot, and if no such distance is required, then a min-
imum distance of twenty feet; (2) conveyances changing the size 
and shape of lots in such a manner as not to leave any lot without the 
prescribed frontage; (3) division of a tract on which two or more 
buildings were standing, when subdivision control became effective in 
the locality, into separate lots on each of which one of the buildings 
remains standing.4 
A curious result of the new definition is that a division of land 
which is not expressly excluded from the definition of subdivision by 
the new proviso may, by reason of a minute frontage on an unap-
proved way, be deemed not to be a "subdivision" on the theory that 
"provision for one or more new ways" is not required. Grammatically, 
there is some basis for this view but it renders the new proviso com-
pletely superfluous and does violence to the principle of statutory 
construction which requires that effect be given, if possible, to every 
word. There is good reason to believe that the planners considered 
the two limitations complementary and, therefore, that any division 
lacking the required frontage for each lot on a public way or approved 
private way is a "subdivision." However, many lawyers seem to be of 
the opinion that the existence of an ancient way removes the land 
from subdivision control despite the absence of the frontage pre-
scribed in the amendment.5 
Boundary adjustments and divisions which go with the sale of one 
or more existing building are, by and large, excluded from the defini-
tion of subdivision. Conveyances made to adjust boundaries clearly 
• G.L., c. 41, §8IL, inserted by Acts of 1953, c. 674, §7. It is not always easy to find 
out whether a particular way is a public way or not, but that is a problem that con· 
veyancers have long been accustomed to. 
• This precise question has already come before the Superior Court in Rettig v. 
Rowley Planning Board (Essex Superior Court, In Equity, No. 10143), and on August 
2, 1954, Rome, J., decreed: " ... the plan in question does not require the approval 
of the Planning Board of Rowley under the Subdivision Control Law G.L. (Ter. 
Ed.), c. 41, §81A to 8lGG Incl., inasmuch as the ways in question were all existing 
and adequate for access for vehicular traffic to the lots shown on said plan when the 
Subdivision Control Law became effective in Rowley." As this volume goes to press, 
an appeal is being taken to the Supreme Judicial Court. 
5
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ought not to be subject to subdivision contro1.6 Although such a con-
veyance is necessarily made to an abutter, if the planning board quali-
fies its endorsement of the plan by some such language as "approval 
not required for conveyance to an abutter" it would, with respect to 
acceptance of the plan for recording, amount to a refusal to endorse at 
all, because the register of deeds does not know the identity of the 
abutters. If the planning board is satisfied as to the identity of the 
abutter, it can designate him by name. Since most boundary adjust-
ments involve parcels too small for building, planning boards are usu-
ally content to give unqualified endorsement. 
§2.5. Clarifying powers of planning boards. To meet complaints 
that some planning boards were arrogating to themselves the zoning 
powers of the town meeting or the city council and prescribing rules 
and regulations relating to the size and use of lots, such activities were 
expressly prohibited.! At the same time, to meet complaints, made by 
developers and planning boards alike, that the old law was too inflexi-
ble and gave the board no discretion to do other than impose the same 
requirements (as to paving, curbstones, sidewalks, utilities, etc.), for 
little divisions and for big developments, the new law provided for 
waiver of strict compliance in any particular case.2 A board is now 
empowered to approve a substandard way leading to a limited number 
of houses, and attach conditions requiring resubmission for further 
development. 
To avoid a constitutional doubt, the provision which authorized a 
board to require a subdivider to dedicate a park to the public was 
stricken out, and such a requirement, without just compensation, was 
expressly prohibited.3 
§2.6. Subdivision laws and the clearing of some titles. Since many 
titles had become somewhat tangled in recent years by reason of the 
unsuspected impact thereon of the Subdivision Control Law, the need 
for some kind of retroactive cure was recognized.1 With respect to reg-
istered land, this took the form of a provision that plans of subdivi-
sions registered or confirmed by the Land Court prior to February I, 
1952,2 should be as valid as if approved. Planning board control was 
protected by the power given to the board to require, as to lots not 
sold or mortgaged, a change in a plan as a condition of its retaining its 
board-approved status.8 
6 It would seem, however, that the frontage requirements introduced by the amend-
ment are applicable to boundary adjustments. The pertinent sentence of the 
amendment recites: "Conveyances or other instruments adding to, taking away from, 
or changing the size and shape of, lots in such a manner as not to leave any lot so 
affected without the frontage above set forth ... shall also not be deemed to 
constitute a subdivision." G.L., c. 41, §8IL, inserted by Acts of 1953, c. 674, §7. 
§2.5. 1 G.L., c. 41, §81Q, inserted by Acts of 1953, c. 674, §7. 
• Id. §8IR. 
3 Compare §81M of the old law with §81Q of the new. 
§2.6. 1 See G.L., c. 41, §8IFF, inserted by Acts of 1953, c. 674, §7. 
• Since February I, 1952, the court has made sure of compliance with the law. 
S G.L., c. 41, §81W. 
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§2.7. Requirement of approval of planning board before recording 
plans of ways. The old statute provided 1 that no register of deeds 
should record any plan showing proposed ways in any city or town 
having a planning board established under Section 8lA without an 
endorsement by the board to the effect that the laws had been com-
plied with. This imposed on the registers the burden of ascertaining 
whether ways shown on a plan were proposed ways or existing ways, 
and the making of such a quasi-judicial determination was foreign to 
the traditional duties of a register. Moreover, he had no means of 
making it. To relieve him of this burden, the new statute2 provides 
that no register shall record any plan showing a division of a tract and 
ways, whether existing or proposed, providing access thereto, without 
an endorsement by the planning board that it approves, or that its ap-
proval is not required. There was some grumbling at what appeared 
to be the grant of even more power to the board, but it seemed fairly 
obvious that the register ought to be relieved, and the board is the log-
ical resort for what is not a discretionary determination.3 
§2.8. Sanctions for enforcement. In the new statute,l the sanctions 
for enforcement are made more specific. The old statute's2 denial of a 
building permit meant nothing in towns which had subdivision control 
but did not have a building by-law. The new statute3 prohibits build-
ing in a subdivision without permission from the planning board, if 
subdivision control is in effect and there is no building code. 
For the sake of quieting titles, a one-year statute of limitations was 
imposed upon proceedings in equity to enforce the Subdivision Con-
trol Law. This does not mean that a year after a division the law 
can be ignored, for a person who buys a vacant lot may not get munic-
ipal services, or a permit to build, because of an improper subdivision 
more than a year old. It does mean that one who buys a house in a 
subdivision more than a year old is safe from having to move it or tear 
it down, but theoretically he might have trouble getting a permit to 
rebuild in case of fire. The practical risk of such trouble, however, 
seems very remote. A mortgage on such property, if adequately in-
sured against casualty, would be a safe enough investment. 
§2.9. Board of appeals. Under the old statute,l the power to grant 
relief from strict compliance in case of practical difficulty or unneces-
sary hardship was denied the planning board and vested in a board 
of appeals. Conscientious planning boards felt themselves hampered 
by this restriction and, accordingly, the new statute2 empowers the 
§2.7. 'C.L., c. 41, §81O. 
2Id. §81X. 
3 See a note by the author in 38 Mass. L.Q., No.4, p. 10 (1953). 
§2.8. 'C.L., c. 41, §81Y, inserted by Acts of 1953, c. 674, §7. 
2 Id. §81Q. 
3Id. §81Y. 
§2.9. 'C.L., c. 41, §81Q. 
2 Id. §81R, inserted by Acts of 1953, c. 674, §7. 
• I 
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planning board to waive strict compliance in appropriate situations. 
The provisions for a board of appeals were left in, however, in-
cluding the provision which forbids a planning board to be the sub-
division board of appeal, even though it is permitted to be the zoning 
board of appeaJ.3 This confusing multiplicity of boards could no 
doubt have been simplified, but that would have involved a general re-
casting of planning and zoning procedures somewhat outside the scope 
of a revision based on the need to reconcile them with title proce-
dures. 
§2.10. Judicial appeal provisions. The existing provision for ap-
peal to the Superior Court was retained substantially unchanged,1 ex-
cept that the period for appeal was changed from fifteen days to 
twenty. There was some discussion of the term "any person, whether 
or not previously a party to the proceedings, aggrieved by a decision," 
both in this connection and in connection with the requirements for 
notice of hearings.2 The class of "persons aggrieved" is not defined.3 
The requirement of notice to the abutters, and the history of the same 
language in the Zoning Enabling Act4 make it fairly clear, however, 
, that the class is not limited to the subdividee and the town officials. It 
was argued that whereas a neighbor might be injured and so ag-
grieved by the operation of a soap factory in a district zoned for resi-
dential purposes, thus justifying his individual right of appeal, he 
would have no concern with the creation of a private way through 
his neighbor's land, and hence would have no standing to object that 
the way might be too steep or too narrow. The objection to giving 
, an indefinite class of neighbors a right of appeal is that every im-
I proper subdivision nipped by vigilant neighbors when the planning 
board goes to sleep is offset by the proper subdivisions being delayed 
by the necessity of waiting out the appeal period.5 The clinching ar-
gument, from the conveyancing point of view, in favor of giving the 
right of appeal to "any person aggrieved" is that it brings all possible 
objectors within the same form of procedure, with its twenty-day limi-
tation. If they did not have this right of appeal they might have a 
right to seek mandamus,6 and there would be no limitation other than 
laches on the time within which this petition might be brought. For a 
record title, laches are far less satisfactory than the expiration of a stat-
utory appeal period of twenty days. Everyone agreed on one thing: 
that the word "previously" was superfluous, and it was dropped. 
• Id. §§SlY, SlZ, SlAA. 
§2.l0. 1 §SlT of the old law; §SlBB of the new. 
2 §81L of the old law; §Sl T of the new. 
S See Nichols, The Massachusetts Law of Planning and Zoning 49 (1943). 
• G.L., c. 40A, §21. Chapter 40A was inserted by Acts of 1954, c. 36S, as a revision 
of G.L., c. 40, §§25-30B. Compare Tranfaglia v. Building Commissioner of Win-
chester, 306 Mass. 495, 28 N.E.2d 537 (1940), with Acts of 1941, c. 19S. 
5 Nichols, The Massachusetts Law of Planning and Zoning IS7 (1943). His re-
marks were directed to zoning, but the reasoning may also be applied to planning. 
6 Tranfaglia v. Building Commissioner of Winchester, 306 Mass. 495, 2S N.E.2d 537 
(1940). 
8
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The expression "or make such other decree as justice and equity 
may require," contained in the appeal section of the old law, was lifted 
bodily from the Zoning Enabling Act 7 and was left unchanged in the 
revision of the subdivision control law, although no one was quite 
sure what it meant. This question has been partially clarified by 
the Court in Pendergast v. Board of Appeals of Barnstable,S at least in 
so far as the appeal is taken from the denial of discretionary relief. 
The case dealt with zoning, but the language construed is identical. 
The main function of a board of appeal under the subdivision con- , 
trollaw is to grant discretionary relief.9 The statute also provides for 
appeal directly to the Superior Court from any decision of a plan-
ning board concerning a plan of a subdivision. Since some of the 
power of the planning board is also discretionary, such as the power to 
waive strict compliance with its rules, the Pendergast case would ap-
ply to appeals in that category. 
On the other hand, a decision by a planning board to approve or 
disapprove a definitive plan under Section SIU, highly technical and 
administrative as it may be, is not discretionary, and should not be, so 
long as we enjoy a government of laws and not of men. One may not 
have a legal right to a variance,to but one who complies with all rea-
sonable rules and regulations of the board ought to have a legal right 
to have his plan approved unless the board finds and states a good rea-
son to disapprove. So far as possible, the reasons for disapproval 
ought to be set forth in the regulations, but it is conceivable that 
peculiar circumstances might afford a reason for disapproval which 
would not be of sufficiently general application to be made a regula-
tion. 
B. OTHER LEGISLATION 
§2.11. Notice to the Commissioner of Corporations and Taxation 
in corporate conveyances. An interesting episode in the history of 
Massachusetts conveyancing came to an end with the enactment of 
Chapter 461 of the Acts of 1954. For many years a statute1 had been 
on the books under which 
The sale or transfer, otherwise than in the ordinary course of 
trade and in the regular and usual prosecution of the corporation's 
business, of any part or the whole of the assets of a domestic busi-
7 G.L., c. 40A, §21. 
81954 Mass. Adv. Sh. 633, 120 N.E.2d 916. For discussion of the case, see Section 
14.26 infra. 
• There is also a provision in C.L., c. 41, §81R, inserted by Acts of 1953, c. 674, §7, 
for review by a board of appeal of a determination that land is being used for a 
purpose other than industrial. This would appear to be a strictly judicial deter-
mination. 
10 Pendergast v. Board of Appeals of Barnstable, 1954 Mass. Adv. Sh. 633, 634, 120 
N.E.2d 916, 918. 
§2.ll. 1 C.L., c. 63, §76; Acts of 1910, c. 187; Acts of 1919, c. 349, §19; id., c. 355, 
§§lJ, 26; Acts of 1923, c. 140. 
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ness corporation, or of any part or the whole of the assets situated 
in the commonwealth of a foreign business corporation, shall be 
fraudulent and void as against the commonwealth, unless such 
corporation shall, at least five days before the sale or transfer, notify 
the commissioner [of corporations and taxation] of the proposed 
sale or transfer and of the price, terms and conditions thereof, and 
of the character and location of said assets. 
It underwent occasional changes as from time to time the tax laws 
were overhauled, but the changes are not material to this discussion. 
In fact, the statute and the amendments were ignored by the bar. If 
anyone remembered them at all, they were vaguely associated with 
stockholders' votes which are required for a sale of all the assets.2 
That the Commissioner was entitled to notice of a sale of "any part" 
of the assets was overlooked. 
A few lawyers, including the writer, however, were bothered by the 
statute,3 and they made themselves extremely unpopular now and then 
by insisting on the notice, to the annoyance of their brothers. In an 
appendix to the 1949 Supplement to Crocker's Notes on Common 
Forms (Swaim ed.),4 the writer undertook to justify himself by calling 
attention to the statute, with results entirely unexpected by him. The 
bankruptcy bar picked it up; read it alongside Section 70(e) of the 
Bankruptcy Act, which provides: "A transfer made or suffered or ob-
ligation incurred by a debtor adjudged a bankrupt under this Act 
which, under any Federal or State law applicable thereto, is fraudulent 
as against or voidable for any other reason by any creditor of the 
debtor, having a claim provable under this Act, shall be null and void 
as against the trustee of such debtor"; and proceeded to attack a num-
ber of mortgages which had been given by their debtors without no-
tice to the Commissioner.5 This was a bombshell, naturally, to mort-
gages generally and to their attorneys. Since the statute provided no 
machinery for a release or discharge of the Commissioner's rights, 
there was little that could be done to reinforce mortgages already 
taken to secure loans already made, but great care was exercised with 
respect to deeds and mortgages given thereafter. 
The question came before the United States District Court for the 
District of Massachusetts6 and Judge Sweeney found ample evidence 
to support the referee's finding that the particular mortgage involved 
had been given in the ordinary course of trade and the regular and 
usual prosecution of the corporation's business. He went on to ex-
press a doubt that Chapter 63, Section 76 applied to mortgages, or that 
• G.L., c. 156, §42. 
• See Sullivan v. F. E. Atteaux & Co., Inc. 284 Mass. 515, 187 N.E. 906 (1933). 
• Pages 105, 106. 
5 See In the Matter of Davis Aircraft Engineering, Inc., In Bankruptcy, No. 311-52; 
In the Matter of F. A. Whitney Carriage Co., In Bankruptcy, No. 350-52. 
• In the Matter of F. A. Whitney Carriage Co., In Bankruptcy, No. 350-52. The 
mortgage attacked in the Davis case was held valid by Referee Wilfred H. Smart, in 
an order dated October 30, 1953, from which no appeal was taken. 
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a trustee in bankruptcy could step into the Commissioner's shoes if it 
did.7 
This guarded language did not reassure the conveyancing bar, and 
two bills were filed in the legislature,S both designed to cure retro-
actively all prior transfers of any flaw based on lack of notice. One of 
these bills proposed to repeal Section 76 outright; the other merely to 
amend it. The proponents joined forces, conferred at length with the 
Commissioner of Corporations and Taxation and worked out a com-
promise, which was reported favorably by the Joint Committee on 
Taxation.9 
The basic changes were as follows: 
1. The former statute applied to the sale or transfer "of any part 
or the whole of the assets." The new statute is limited to a sale or 
transfer "of all or substantially all of the assets." "Or substantially 
all" is not very satisfactory to conveyancers, who traditionally like to 
know exactly where they stand. It is far better, however, than "any 
part," and the Commissioner was understandably reluctant to consent 
to language which would enable a collapsing corporation to evade 
him by retaining a peppercorn. He has undertaken to define his ver-
sion of "substantially all" by regulations to be issued pursuant to the 
requirements of the new State Administrative Procedure Act.10 
2. Instead of a notice to the Commissioner, the corporation must 
now file a return. This was the Commissioner's proposal. It has no 
relation, of course, to conveyancing. Tax lawyers who may be won-
dering how the corporation can file, five days before the sale, "all such 
tax returns as may be necessary to determine the taxes due . . . to 
and including the date of the sale" may find the answer in the regula-
tions to be issued. 
3. On acco~nt of the drastic consequences which Section 70(e) of 
the Bankruptcy Act attaches to a transfer which is "fraudulent and 
void," this language was dropped, and in its place the Commonwealth 
was given a lien. 
4. To fill an obvious need ignored by the former statute, the Com-
missioner was authorized to grant a waiver prior to the transfer, and 
the Commission on Corporations and Taxation to do so afterward. 
5. The statute was expressly made inapplicable to mortgages given 
in good faith. 
There was no disagreement as to the desirability of curing, nunc 
pro tunc, all those earlier transfers, made without compliance, which 
were skeletons in the closet of almost every lawyer in the Common-
wealth, and the curative language was also quickly agreed upon. 
The Commissioner wiped the slate clean as to all corporate transfers 
made prior to January 1, 1950, and as to all transfers made after De-
cember 31, 1949 and before September 1, 1954, by corporations 
• See an unreported memorandum on file in the case in the District Court. 
S House No. 553 and No. 1466 (1954). 
• House No. 2825 (1954). 
10 G.L., c. 30A, inserted by Acts of 1954, c. 681. 
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which have paid their taxes. Provision is made for clearing this of rec-
ord in the registry of deeds. 
No express attempt was made, of course, to interfere with the rights 
of creditors and trustees in bankruptcy proceedings commenced before 
the effective date of the new statute. The writer is informed that at 
least two such proceedings are pending and that the trustees are at-
tacking, in the Superior Court in Suffolk and Middlesex Counties, 
mortgages given without notice to the Commissioner. It will be inter-
esting to see how they come out, but for most of the bar the interest 
will be academic, in sharp contrast to its interest prior to the new 
statute. 
§2.12. Tenancies by the entirety. Another statute! which is of par-
ticular importance to conveyancers authorizes the creation of a ten-
ancy by the entirety by a direct conveyance from a husband to him-
self and his wife. The conveyance does not become effective until duly 
acknowledged and recorded. The statute, by abrogating the rule laid 
down in Ames v. Chandler? makes it unnecessary to use the device of 
a conveyance to uses or a conveyance to a straw followed by a recon-
veyance to the spouses. It is clear that the statute was intended to ap-
ply to conveyances from a wife to her husband and herself as well as to 
conveyances from husband to husband and wife.3 
The act also amends General Laws, Chapter 184, Section 7 (relating 
to conveyances and devises to two or more persons) by adding the fol-
lowing: "A devise of land to a person and his spouse shall, if the in-
strument creating the devise expressly so states, vest in the devisees a 
tenancy by the entirety." 4 To the extent that the statute permits the 
creation of a tenancy by the entirety by devise, it is declaratory of the 
common law.5 It is probable that the act was not intended to change 
the existing rule that a devise to husband and wife "as joint tenants" 
without more creates a tenancy by the entirety,6 but it is at least argu-
able that the act impliedly permits the creation of a tenancy by the 
entirety by devise only "if the instrument creating the devise expressly 
so states." 
§2.12. 1 Acts of 1954, c. 395. 
2265 Mass. 428, 164 N.E. 616 (1929). In Edge v. Barrow, 316 Mass. 104,55 N.E.2d 
5 (1944), the Court implied that it would, if necessary, reconsider the correctness of 
the ruling in Ames v. Chandler. 
3 See C.L., c. 4, §6 (in construing statutes words importing the masculine gender 
may include the feminine). 
• Acts of 1954, c. 395, §l. 
5 Licker v. Cluskin, 265 Mass. 403, 164 N.E. 613 (1929). 
• Childs v. Childs, 293 Mass. 67, 199 N.E. 383 (1935). Hoag v. Hoag, 213 Mass. 50, 
99 N.E. 521 (1912); see also Edge v. Barrow, 316 Mass. 104, 105,55 N.E.2d 5 (1944). 
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